Abstract

On the occasion of honoring the master Enrique Dussel, we reflect on North-South intercultural dialogues, particularly between the discourse ethics proposed by the great German philosopher Karl Otto-Apel and the ethics of liberation developed by Dussel. The article explores the concept of intercultural dialogue through the analysis of the interactions between the two philosophers. We argue that intercultural dialogue should not be a mere transposition of ideas but a symmetric and authentic exchange that overcomes eurocentrism and epistemic extractivism. The methodology employed includes a critical examination of Apel's and Dussel's ethical proposals, focusing the discussion on discourse ethics and ethics of liberation. It is argued that, although both philosophers seek universality, their approaches diverge: Apel from an abstract and universal perspective, and Dussel from a material and contextual perspective. The article concludes that a true intercultural dialogue must recognize and learn from differences rather than being limited to a one-way exchange.

Many times, when we talk about intercultural dialogues, we do so abstractly, without referring to concrete experiences beyond something instrumental for getting by. In general, we do not take these concepts seriously. To clear up some doubts, we can start by defining what is not an intercultural dialogue. For example, if a European thinker comes to a university in the Global South to give lectures without taking others seriously, that is not an intercultural dialogue; it is a Eurocentric monologue. If an anthropologist – or a researcher in general – studies an indigenous people as a “object” of study, we are facing an imperial colonial relationship as Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2016) suggests.

In other fields of knowledge, such as sociology or philosophy, we could say something similar: Eurocentrism operates in a colonial and imperial manner. When there is no symmetrical exchange, we cannot speak of an intercultural dialogue. When the Other – and their realities – is researched as an object, this is epistemic extractivism or “knowledge extraction,” as Leanne Betasamosake Simpson[1] puts it. In this dynamic of objectification, interculturality is not possible. According to her, capitalism and colonialism extract and assimilate epistemology without escaping this reality.

In this sense, intercultural dialogue seeks to overcome these limitations for a confluence or an ecology of knowledge, as proposed by Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2018). For it to be a dialogue, things cannot go in just one direction; it has to go back and forth. To see a concrete example, let us analyze some topics from the dialogue between philosophers Karl Otto-Apel and Enrique Dussel, who thought from different contexts: one from Europe and the other from Abya Yala. The place of enunciation is important. While there are structural problems, there are also heterogeneities. With this example, we also aim to highlight the possibility of overcoming or at least revealing the prevailing eurocentrism (and epistemic extractivism) in our academic ecosystem.

The dialogue we refer to began in 1989 and led to several meetings. These were part of the North-South Philosophical Dialogue Program, coordinated by Raúl Fornet-Betancourt, who proposed the need for “communicative balance,” an important element for these purposes. A dialogue must, we insist, go in both directions: we learn from the North but also from the South. It is not just about listening to the other; it is more than sitting at a table and communicating (traditionally sender, receiver, and message); it is discernment.

Now, what was the content of this dialogue? The topic was ethics. Although this dialogue was a stage, for example, in the development of Dussel's liberation ethics, it does not mean that it ended there. We can continue to engage with that European tradition of discourse ethics, even with Jürgen Habermas (2000), highlighting the best of the critical tradition. Otto-Apel was part of the second generation of critical theory from the Frankfurt School. While Habermas is better known, Otto-Apel was important during that period with his proposal of “discourse ethics.” On the other hand, there is Dussel with his “liberation ethics.” So, the content of this dialogue is “ethics,” but not just one ethical proposal but two: one from Europe and one from Abya Yala.

The proposal of liberation ethics and discourse ethics have different underlying assumptions. The latter should be considered within the framework of science and technology, as Apel himself notes, “recognized worldwide in modern industrial societies” (Apel 1992, 13), while the former is framed by dependency and underdevelopment. This leads to different assumptions. In between is the old debate about development and progress. It would be a mistake to still think of development as a stage toward progress; we carry a heavy burden with the fetishism of progress. Our realities are different, so the way we address them cannot be the same, considering the heterogeneities.

Let us place our philosophers in the context of the development of their proposals. Apel was born in 1922 and died in 2017; Dussel was born in 1934 and died in 2023. They were two established philosophers, globally recognized, whose works primarily developed from the 1970s: Apel with "The Transformation of Philosophy," and Dussel with "For a Liberation Ethics." In the case of the latter, the learnings from this dialogue were formidable. We also see how, at least in that context, the ethics in question are framed by different turns: Apel, pragmatic, and Dussel, decolonial. This means that although they developed their proposals in the same context, they belong to different projects. What they agreed on was the need for a different world.

I will focus more on Dussel's proposal. In general terms, although both come from different contexts, they will share the fact that their ethics ultimately have a claim to universality. Apel expresses it this way: “the ideal conditions for a possible formation of consensus on norms […] a regulative idea” (Apel 1992, 44), not related to a “world revolution” or “the realm of freedom,” thus distancing himself, at least in this framework, from socialist utopia. Dussel’s ethical approach cannot start from “communication” abstractly, because it is precisely the “silenced Other,” who lacks both the ideal and minimal conditions for expression, that represents the stumbling block for Apel's universalist ethical application. For the liberation philosopher: “The Other is the condition of possibility for all argumentation” (Dussel 1992, 76) and communication.

Before continuing, I want to make a brief parenthesis. I took a course with Juan José Bautista at the Autonomous University of Mexico City in 2017. Bautista passed away in 2021, relatively young, and was one of Dussel’s most advanced disciples, even achieving autonomy towards the end by considering the task of thinking with and beyond the master. He explained to us the importance of this debate and how to understand it within the framework of the major epistemological shifts in the human and social sciences and encouraged us to reflect on how to assume—or subsume—this dialogue. Let us schematically review the shifts to locate ourselves in which one we might be in right now or which one to opt for in the current civilizational crisis.

First, there is the linguistic turn, which took place in the 1950s, with one of its visible figures being Ludwig Wittgenstein, who emphasized the essential function of language. Then there is the pragmatic turn, which is no longer just about language in a pure sense but about its social and practical use. Habermas and Apel are part of this latter turn, both proposing discourse ethics from the pragmatic turn. Bautista’s idea was to subsume these turns to transcend them and then decolonize. The point is this: let us understand these philosophers with their proposals also in the dynamics of the pragmatic and decolonial turns respectively.

As part of the pragmatic turn, Apel and Habermas moved away from the paths of critical theory, and the concept of “alienation” no longer played a central role in their analyses. Critical theory continued even after Axel Honneth, with a critical sociology (for instance, Stephan Lessenich and Esteban Torres). Just because Apel and Habermas took a different path does not mean that critical theory ended with them. Habermas, in the name of revisionism and new configurations, distances himself from that first generation. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to subsume some assumptions or at least consider their ideality of “binding solutions” (Apel 1992, 18) with the caveat that this assumption is simultaneously something transcendental and still unsurpassable, ultimately depending on the “argumentative discourse,” leaving it in an abstract plane regarding the concrete problems of everyday and public life in general.

Let us return to our main topic. Although in entire passages it might seem that both Apel and Dussel defend the same thing, their approaches are different. Apel emphasizes the “argumentative discourse” for establishing norms, being more specific, the “argumentative discourse as an indispensable means for the justification of moral norms” (Apel 1992, 12). According to Apel, discourse ethics will be the only proposal with a solution for post-foundational ethical problems, that is, the problem of justifying moral norms through argumentative discourse. The fundamental aspect of this discourse ethics will be “co-responsibility” (own and that of other participants in the discourse) and ideally “the equal rights of all participants in communication” (Apel 1992, 21); in this general point, we might not disagree.

But let’s continue with some important topics we can identify in this dialogue for true interculturality. Apel will acknowledge the relevance of an Abya Yala proposal, generally from the theory of dependence and particularly Dussel’s liberation ethics. Recall the central thesis of the theory of dependence, which reflects on the existence of a center and a periphery, and how the center benefits from colonization and exploitation in all senses, as there is exploitation on various levels, including the extractivism of metals, but also epistemic exploitation. Often, the center appropriates the knowledge and wisdom of our peoples, which is concrete; all the precious metals extracted generated the wealth of the West, and how many theses are there in the European academic world where the subject and the “object” of study were some of our peoples.

Continuing with our dialogue, Apel recognizes the relevance of Dussel and his critical comments, but Apel continued in his transcendental pragmatics towards a universalist ethics, meaning one that can be valid everywhere. His universalist ethics can address all problems universally, but from its abstraction. Dussel’s ethics also presupposes a claim to universal validity, but from a materiality perspective.

Both have this same claim, but their paths to achieve it are different. We have already noticed one from abstraction and the other from materiality. The materiality in Dussel’s proposal was given by Marx’s thought; when Dussel engaged with Apel, he had already read Marx, not just to be informed but to, as he himself says, explain in strict Marxist categories that center-periphery relationship.

In conclusion, an intercultural dialogue is primarily a dialogue between the center and the periphery, but if a power relationship is reproduced in that dialogue, it would be a failure. Up to this point, I have only highlighted Apel’s abstraction according to his emphasis on language and reflective argumentation with a claim to universality. And secondly, the positive aspect of Apel recognizing the relevance of both the theory of dependence and liberation ethics, which is a fundamental point.

Let’s address some strong points in Dussel that made possible, intentionally, a genuine intercultural dialogue. There will be other dialogues, but this one was documented and quite well. That a thinker of Apel’s stature recognizes and takes seriously a thinker from the South is a sign that a dialogue of this nature is indeed possible. I need to clarify that it is not about a thinker from Abya Yala teaching something to a European thinker; it is obvious that this has happened many times. But that is not what intercultural dialogue is about. It is about taking seriously a thinker from Abya Yala who has proposed, in this case, a liberation ethics. And it is not a one-way street; Dussel also learned a lot from Apel, and there is much to learn from both.

Dussel made several criticisms, such as stating that Apel could not fully understand the categorical aspect of the center-periphery relationship, which is crucial for understanding the material realities of inequality experienced in the periphery. But let's use an even more concrete example: enunciation. Saying "I am hungry" is not a problem of language; it is a real and concrete problem for which thousands of people still die. Even in Panama, there are deaths from hunger. Without delving into issues of inequality, dying from hunger is a concrete problem, not a formal issue of language. Where do people die of hunger? It is in the periphery, in the exteriority. This category that Dussel borrows from Levinas will be one of Apel’s weak points because categorically he positions himself from the modern totality. Categorically, we have a fundamental distinction here. Apel positions himself from the "totality" and thinks from there. In contrast, Dussel positions himself from the "exteriority," where the other is denied as the Other. Apel aims to think about this Other but from the totality, abstractly through argumentative communication.

Now, let’s conclude with Dussel’s proposal, so to speak, remastered. In summary and explicitly, with elements that may not necessarily be presented this way by Dussel but are assumed in his mature work, especially in the Ethics of Liberation. In the intercultural dialogue with Apel, it was important to have an interlocutor of that level because it also compelled him to think through the pragmatic turn, even subsuming it. Dussel even stated that his true graduation was the dialogue with Apel, despite already having two doctoral degrees.

Dussel’s proposal, like Apel’s, claims universality. We can present them this way, including some of our elements following the master’s lead and trying to make it as explicit as possible. Dussel, who highlighted Apel’s weak points, proposes an ethics of principles. What is that principle? The material principle of reproducing and affirming life in a metabolic relationship with nature and other species to move beyond a certain modern anthropocentrism. Here we have an immanent proposal with a locus of enunciation, categorically the exteriority, where the subject is denied and is practiced, as Giorgio Agamben says, as a “thanatopolitics.”

At a mature stage, after reading Marx and the fruitful intercultural dialogue with Apel, Dussel was able to propose the material principle of this type with an immanent claim to universality. This proposal is no longer only read in Abya Yala but is studied in Europe, Asia, Africa. In short, this is the result of interculturality: the recognition and learning from the different and how this can contribute to a better world is possible.